arrives at a conclusion in a case analogous to that given in my text.
See his article, Mr. Darwin s Critics, in the Contemporary Review,
Nov. 1871, p. 462, and in his Critiques and Essays, 1873, p. 279.)
The same would apply to the elephant and the bear making currents in
the air or water. The savage would certainly neither know nor care by
what law the desired movements were effected; yet his act would be
guided by a rude process of reasoning, as surely as would a philosopher
in his longest chain of deductions. There would no doubt be this
difference between him and one of the higher animals, that he would
take notice of much slighter circumstances and conditions, and would
observe any connection between them after much less experience, and
this would be of paramount importance. I kept a daily record of the
actions of one of my infants, and when he was about eleven months old,
and before he could speak a single word, I was continually struck with
the greater quickness, with which all sorts of objects and sounds were
associated together in his mind, compared with that of the most
intelligent dogs I ever knew. But the higher animals differ in exactly
the same way in this power of association from those low in the scale,
such as the pike, as well as in that of drawing inferences and of
observation.
The promptings of reason, after very short experience, are well shewn
by the following actions of American monkeys, which stand low in their
order. Rengger, a most careful observer, states that when he first gave
eggs to his monkeys in Paraguay, they smashed them, and thus lost much
of their contents; afterwards they gently hit one end against some hard
body, and picked off the bits of shell with their fingers. After
cutting themselves only ONCE with any sharp tool, they would not touch
it again, or would handle it with the greatest caution. Lumps of sugar
were often given them wrapped up in paper; and Rengger sometimes put a
live wasp in the paper, so that in hastily unfolding it they got stung;
after this had ONCE happened, they always first held the packet to
their ears to detect any movement within. (26. Mr. Belt, in his most
interesting work, The Naturalist in Nicaragua, 1874, (p. 119),
likewise describes various actions of a tamed Cebus, which, I think,
clearly shew that this animal possessed some reasoning power.)
The following cases relate to dogs. Mr. Colquhoun (27. The Moor and
the Loch, p. 45. Col. Hutchinson on Dog Breaking, 1850, p. 46.)
winged two wild-ducks, which fell on the further side of a stream; his
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