pointer dog, if able to reflect on his past conduct, would say to
himself, I ought (as indeed we say of him) to have pointed at that hare
and not have yielded to the passing temptation of hunting it.
Social animals are impelled partly by a wish to aid the members of
their community in a general manner, but more commonly to perform
certain definite actions. Man is impelled by the same general wish to
aid his fellows; but has few or no special instincts. He differs also
from the lower animals in the power of expressing his desires by words,
which thus become a guide to the aid required and bestowed. The motive
to give aid is likewise much modified in man: it no longer consists
solely of a blind instinctive impulse, but is much influenced by the
praise or blame of his fellows. The appreciation and the bestowal of
praise and blame both rest on sympathy; and this emotion, as we have
seen, is one of the most important elements of the social instincts.
Sympathy, though gained as an instinct, is also much strengthened by
exercise or habit. As all men desire their own happiness, praise or
blame is bestowed on actions and motives, according as they lead to
this end; and as happiness is an essential part of the general good,
the greatest-happiness principle indirectly serves as a nearly safe
standard of right and wrong. As the reasoning powers advance and
experience is gained, the remoter effects of certain lines of conduct
on the character of the individual, and on the general good, are
perceived; and then the self-regarding virtues come within the scope of
public opinion, and receive praise, and their opposites blame. But with
the less civilised nations reason often errs, and many bad customs and
base superstitions come within the same scope, and are then esteemed as
high virtues, and their breach as heavy crimes.
The moral faculties are generally and justly esteemed as of higher
value than the intellectual powers. But we should bear in mind that the
activity of the mind in vividly recalling past impressions is one of
the fundamental though secondary bases of conscience. This affords the
strongest argument for educating and stimulating in all possible ways
the intellectual faculties of every human being. No doubt a man with a
torpid mind, if his social affections and sympathies are well
developed, will be led to good actions, and may have a fairly sensitive
conscience. But whatever renders the imagination more vivid and
strengthens the habit of recalling and comparing past impressions, will
make the conscience more sensitive, and may even somewhat compensate
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