to the early use of some simple form of language, that wonderful engine
which affixes signs to all sorts of objects and qualities, and excites
trains of thought which would never arise from the mere impression of
the senses, or if they did arise could not be followed out. The higher
intellectual powers of man, such as those of ratiocination,
abstraction, self-consciousness, etc., probably follow from the
continued improvement and exercise of the other mental faculties.
The development of the moral qualities is a more interesting problem.
The foundation lies in the social instincts, including under this term
the family ties. These instincts are highly complex, and in the case of
the lower animals give special tendencies towards certain definite
actions; but the more important elements are love, and the distinct
emotion of sympathy. Animals endowed with the social instincts take
pleasure in one another s company, warn one another of danger, defend
and aid one another in many ways. These instincts do not extend to all
the individuals of the species, but only to those of the same
community. As they are highly beneficial to the species, they have in
all probability been acquired through natural selection.
A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions
and their motives of approving of some and disapproving of others; and
the fact that man is the one being who certainly deserves this
designation, is the greatest of all distinctions between him and the
lower animals. But in the fourth chapter I have endeavoured to shew
that the moral sense follows, firstly, from the enduring and
ever-present nature of the social instincts; secondly, from man s
appreciation of the approbation and disapprobation of his fellows; and
thirdly, from the high activity of his mental faculties, with past
impressions extremely vivid; and in these latter respects he differs
from the lower animals. Owing to this condition of mind, man cannot
avoid looking both backwards and forwards, and comparing past
impressions. Hence after some temporary desire or passion has mastered
his social instincts, he reflects and compares the now weakened
impression of such past impulses with the ever-present social
instincts; and he then feels that sense of dissatisfaction which all
unsatisfied instincts leave behind them, he therefore resolves to act
differently for the future, and this is conscience. Any instinct,
permanently stronger or more enduring than another, gives rise to a
feeling which we express by saying that it ought to be obeyed. A
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