in the horror felt by a Hindoo who breaks his caste, and in many other
such cases. It would be difficult to distinguish between the remorse
felt by a Hindoo who has yielded to the temptation of eating unclean
food, from that felt after committing a theft; but the former would
probably be the more severe.
How so many absurd rules of conduct, as well as so many absurd
religious beliefs, have originated, we do not know; nor how it is that
they have become, in all quarters of the world, so deeply impressed on
the mind of men; but it is worthy of remark that a belief constantly
inculcated during the early years of life, whilst the brain is
impressible, appears to acquire almost the nature of an instinct; and
the very essence of an instinct is that it is followed independently of
reason. Neither can we say why certain admirable virtues, such as the
love of truth, are much more highly appreciated by some savage tribes
than by others (43. Good instances are given by Mr. Wallace in
Scientific Opinion, Sept. 15, 1869; and more fully in his
Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, 1870, p. 353.);
nor, again, why similar differences prevail even amongst highly
civilised nations. Knowing how firmly fixed many strange customs and
superstitions have become, we need feel no surprise that the
self-regarding virtues, supported as they are by reason, should now
appear to us so natural as to be thought innate, although they were not
valued by man in his early condition.
Not withstanding many sources of doubt, man can generally and readily
distinguish between the higher and lower moral rules. The higher are
founded on the social instincts, and relate to the welfare of others.
They are supported by the approbation of our fellow-men and by reason.
The lower rules, though some of them when implying self-sacrifice
hardly deserve to be called lower, relate chiefly to self, and arise
from public opinion, matured by experience and cultivation; for they
are not practised by rude tribes.
As man advances in civilisation, and small tribes are united into
larger communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that
he ought to extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the
members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This
point being once reached, there is only an artificial barrier to
prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and races.
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