found practicable, to use the same definition in both cases, and to
take as the standard of morality, the general good or welfare of the
community, rather than the general happiness; but this definition would
perhaps require some limitation on account of political ethics.
When a man risks his life to save that of a fellow-creature, it seems
also more correct to say that he acts for the general good, rather than
for the general happiness of mankind. No doubt the welfare and the
happiness of the individual usually coincide; and a contented, happy
tribe will flourish better than one that is discontented and unhappy.
We have seen that even at an early period in the history of man, the
expressed wishes of the community will have naturally influenced to a
large extent the conduct of each member; and as all wish for happiness,
the greatest happiness principle will have become a most important
secondary guide and object; the social instinct, however, together with
sympathy (which leads to our regarding the approbation and
disapprobation of others), having served as the primary impulse and
guide. Thus the reproach is removed of laying the foundation of the
noblest part of our nature in the base principle of selfishness;
unless, indeed, the satisfaction which every animal feels, when it
follows its proper instincts, and the dissatisfaction felt when
prevented, be called selfish.
The wishes and opinions of the members of the same community, expressed
at first orally, but later by writing also, either form the sole guides
of our conduct, or greatly reinforce the social instincts; such
opinions, however, have sometimes a tendency directly opposed to these
instincts. This latter fact is well exemplified by the LAW OF HONOUR,
that is, the law of the opinion of our equals, and not of all our
countrymen. The breach of this law, even when the breach is known to be
strictly accordant with true morality, has caused many a man more agony
than a real crime. We recognise the same influence in the burning sense
of shame which most of us have felt, even after the interval of years,
when calling to mind some accidental breach of a trifling, though
fixed, rule of etiquette. The judgment of the community will generally
be guided by some rude experience of what is best in the long run for
all the members; but this judgment will not rarely err from ignorance
and weak powers of reasoning. Hence the strangest customs and
superstitions, in complete opposition to the true welfare and happiness
of mankind, have become all-powerful throughout the world. We see this
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