works I have consulted, with a few exceptions (42. Mill recognises
( System of Logic, vol. ii. p. 422) in the clearest manner, that
actions may be performed through habit without the anticipation of
pleasure. Mr. H. Sidgwick also, in his Essay on Pleasure and Desire
( The Contemporary Review, April 1872, p. 671), remarks: To sum up,
in contravention of the doctrine that our conscious active impulses are
always directed towards the production of agreeable sensations in
ourselves, I would maintain that we find everywhere in consciousness
extra-regarding impulse, directed towards something that is not
pleasure; that in many cases the impulse is so far incompatible with
the self-regarding that the two do not easily co-exist in the same
moment of consciousness. A dim feeling that our impulses do not by any
means always arise from any contemporaneous or anticipated pleasure,
has, I cannot but think, been one chief cause of the acceptance of the
intuitive theory of morality, and of the rejection of the utilitarian
or Greatest happiness theory. With respect to the latter theory the
standard and the motive of conduct have no doubt often been confused,
but they are really in some degree blended.), write as if there must be
a distinct motive for every action, and that this must be associated
with some pleasure or displeasure. But man seems often to act
impulsively, that is from instinct or long habit, without any
consciousness of pleasure, in the same manner as does probably a bee or
ant, when it blindly follows its instincts. Under circumstances of
extreme peril, as during a fire, when a man endeavours to save a
fellow-creature without a moment s hesitation, he can hardly feel
pleasure; and still less has he time to reflect on the dissatisfaction
which he might subsequently experience if he did not make the attempt.
Should he afterwards reflect over his own conduct, he would feel that
there lies within him an impulsive power widely different from a search
after pleasure or happiness; and this seems to be the deeply planted
social instinct.
In the case of the lower animals it seems much more appropriate to
speak of their social instincts, as having been developed for the
general good rather than for the general happiness of the species. The
term, general good, may be defined as the rearing of the greatest
number of individuals in full vigour and health, with all their
faculties perfect, under the conditions to which they are subjected. As
the social instincts both of man and the lower animals have no doubt
been developed by nearly the same steps, it would be advisable, if
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