We have now seen that actions are regarded by savages, and were
probably so regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they
obviously affect the welfare of the tribe, not that of the species, nor
that of an individual member of the tribe. This conclusion agrees well
with the belief that the so-called moral sense is aboriginally derived
from the social instincts, for both relate at first exclusively to the
community.
The chief causes of the low morality of savages, as judged by our
standard, are, firstly, the confinement of sympathy to the same tribe.
Secondly, powers of reasoning insufficient to recognise the bearing of
many virtues, especially of the self-regarding virtues, on the general
welfare of the tribe. Savages, for instance, fail to trace the
multiplied evils consequent on a want of temperance, chastity, etc.
And, thirdly, weak power of self-command; for this power has not been
strengthened through long-continued, perhaps inherited, habit,
instruction and religion.
I have entered into the above details on the immorality of savages (39.
See on this subject copious evidence in Chap. vii. of Sir J. Lubbock,
Origin of Civilisation, 1870.), because some authors have recently
taken a high view of their moral nature, or have attributed most of
their crimes to mistaken benevolence. (40. For instance Lecky, History
of European Morals, vol. i. p. 124.) These authors appear to rest
their conclusion on savages possessing those virtues which are
serviceable, or even necessary, for the existence of the family and of
the tribe, qualities which they undoubtedly do possess, and often in a
high degree.
CONCLUDING REMARKS.
It was assumed formerly by philosophers of the derivative (41. This
term is used in an able article in the Westminster Review, Oct. 1869,
p. 498. For the Greatest happiness principle, see J.S. Mill,
Utilitarianism, p. 17.) school of morals that the foundation of
morality lay in a form of Selfishness; but more recently the Greatest
happiness principle has been brought prominently forward. It is,
however, more correct to speak of the latter principle as the standard,
and not as the motive of conduct. Nevertheless, all the authors whose
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