special God-implanted conscience. On the whole it is intelligible, that
a man urged by so powerful a sentiment as remorse, though arising as
above explained, should be led to act in a manner, which he has been
taught to believe serves as an expiation, such as delivering himself up
to justice.
Man prompted by his conscience, will through long habit acquire such
perfect self-command, that his desires and passions will at last yield
instantly and without a struggle to his social sympathies and
instincts, including his feeling for the judgment of his fellows. The
still hungry, or the still revengeful man will not think of stealing
food, or of wreaking his vengeance. It is possible, or as we shall
hereafter see, even probable, that the habit of self-command may, like
other habits, be inherited. Thus at last man comes to feel, through
acquired and perhaps inherited habit, that it is best for him to obey
his more persistent impulses. The imperious word ought seems merely
to imply the consciousness of the existence of a rule of conduct,
however it may have originated. Formerly it must have been often
vehemently urged that an insulted gentleman OUGHT to fight a duel. We
even say that a pointer OUGHT to point, and a retriever to retrieve
game. If they fail to do so, they fail in their duty and act wrongly.
If any desire or instinct leading to an action opposed to the good of
others still appears, when recalled to mind, as strong as, or stronger
than, the social instinct, a man will feel no keen regret at having
followed it; but he will be conscious that if his conduct were known to
his fellows, it would meet with their disapprobation; and few are so
destitute of sympathy as not to feel discomfort when this is realised.
If he has no such sympathy, and if his desires leading to bad actions
are at the time strong, and when recalled are not over-mastered by the
persistent social instincts, and the judgment of others, then he is
essentially a bad man (30. Dr. Prosper Despine, in his Psychologie
Naturelle, 1868 (tom. i. p. 243; tom. ii. p. 169) gives many curious
cases of the worst criminals, who apparently have been entirely
destitute of conscience.); and the sole restraining motive left is the
fear of punishment, and the conviction that in the long run it would be
best for his own selfish interests to regard the good of others rather
than his own.
It is obvious that every one may with an easy conscience gratify his
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