impulsively, as in the above cases, do not come under the dominion of
the moral sense, and cannot be called moral. They confine this term to
actions done deliberately, after a victory over opposing desires, or
when prompted by some exalted motive. But it appears scarcely possible
to draw any clear line of distinction of this kind. (25. I refer here
to the distinction between what has been called MATERIAL and FORMAL
morality. I am glad to find that Professor Huxley ( Critiques and
Addresses, 1873, p. 287) takes the same view on this subject as I do.
Mr. Leslie Stephen remarks ( Essays on Freethinking and Plain
Speaking, 1873, p. 83), the metaphysical distinction, between
material and formal morality is as irrelevant as other such
distinctions. ) As far as exalted motives are concerned, many instances
have been recorded of savages, destitute of any feeling of general
benevolence towards mankind, and not guided by any religious motive,
who have deliberately sacrificed their lives as prisoners(26. I have
given one such case, namely of three Patagonian Indians who preferred
being shot, one after the other, to betraying the plans of their
companions in war ( Journal of Researches, 1845, p. 103).), rather
than betray their comrades; and surely their conduct ought to be
considered as moral. As far as deliberation, and the victory over
opposing motives are concerned, animals may be seen doubting between
opposed instincts, in rescuing their offspring or comrades from danger;
yet their actions, though done for the good of others, are not called
moral. Moreover, anything performed very often by us, will at last be
done without deliberation or hesitation, and can then hardly be
distinguished from an instinct; yet surely no one will pretend that
such an action ceases to be moral. On the contrary, we all feel that an
act cannot be considered as perfect, or as performed in the most noble
manner, unless it be done impulsively, without deliberation or effort,
in the same manner as by a man in whom the requisite qualities are
innate. He who is forced to overcome his fear or want of sympathy
before he acts, deserves, however, in one way higher credit than the
man whose innate disposition leads him to a good act without effort. As
we cannot distinguish between motives, we rank all actions of a certain
class as moral, if performed by a moral being. A moral being is one who
is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives, and of
approving or disapproving of them. We have no reason to suppose that
any of the lower animals have this capacity; therefore, when a
Newfoundland dog drags a child out of the water, or a monkey faces
danger to rescue its comrade, or takes charge of an orphan monkey, we
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