hunger, cold, fatigue, revives in us some recollection of these states,
which are painful even in idea. We are thus impelled to relieve the
sufferings of another, in order that our own painful feelings may be at
the same time relieved. In like manner we are led to participate in the
pleasures of others. (21. See the first and striking chapter in Adam
Smith s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Also Mr. Bain s Mental and Moral
Science, 1868, pp. 244, and 275-282. Mr. Bain states, that, sympathy
is, indirectly, a source of pleasure to the sympathiser ; and he
accounts for this through reciprocity. He remarks that the person
benefited, or others in his stead, may make up, by sympathy and good
offices returned, for all the sacrifice. But if, as appears to be the
case, sympathy is strictly an instinct, its exercise would give direct
pleasure, in the same manner as the exercise, as before remarked, of
almost every other instinct.) But I cannot see how this view explains
the fact that sympathy is excited, in an immeasurably stronger degree,
by a beloved, than by an indifferent person. The mere sight of
suffering, independently of love, would suffice to call up in us vivid
recollections and associations. The explanation may lie in the fact
that, with all animals, sympathy is directed solely towards the members
of the same community, and therefore towards known, and more or less
beloved members, but not to all the individuals of the same species.
This fact is not more surprising than that the fears of many animals
should be directed against special enemies. Species which are not
social, such as lions and tigers, no doubt feel sympathy for the
suffering of their own young, but not for that of any other animal.
With mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitation, probably add, as
Mr. Bain has shewn, to the power of sympathy; for we are led by the
hope of receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic
kindness to others; and sympathy is much strengthened by habit. In
however complex a manner this feeling may have originated, as it is one
of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one
another, it will have been increased through natural selection; for
those communities, which included the greatest number of the most
sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number
of offspring.
It is, however, impossible to decide in many cases whether certain
social instincts have been acquired through natural selection, or are
the indirect result of other instincts and faculties, such as sympathy,
reason, experience, and a tendency to imitation; or again, whether they
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