especially excite each other s blushes. It becomes obvious why personal
remarks should be particularly liable to cause blushing, and why the
most powerful of all the causes is shyness; for shyness relates to the
presence and opinion of others, and the shy are always more or less
self-conscious. With respect to real shame from moral delinquencies, we
can perceive why it is not guilt, but the thought that others think us
guilty, which raises a blush. A man reflecting on a crime committed in
solitude, and stung by his conscience, does not blush; yet he will
blush under the vivid recollection of a detected fault, or of one
committed in the presence of others, the degree of blushing being
closely related to the feeling of regard for those who have detected,
witnessed, or suspected his fault. Breaches of conventional rules of
conduct, if they are rigidly insisted on by our equals or superiors,
often cause more intense blushes even than a detected crime, and an act
which is really criminal, if not blamed by our equals, hardly raises a
tinge of colour on our cheeks. Modesty from humility, or from an
indelicacy, excites a vivid blush, as both relate to the judgment or
fixed customs of others.
From the intimate sympathy which exists between the capillary
circulation of the surface of the head and of the brain, whenever there
is intense blushing, there will be some, and often great, confusion of
mind. This is frequently accompanied by awkward movements, and
sometimes by the involuntary twitching of certain muscles.
As blushing, according to this hypothesis, is an indirect result of
attention, originally directed to our personal appearance, that is to
the surface of the body, and more especially to the face, we can
understand the meaning of the gestures which accompany blushing
throughout the world. These consist in hiding the face, or turning it
towards the ground, or to one side. The eyes are generally averted or
are restless, for to look at the man who causes us to feel shame or
shyness, immediately brings home in an intolerable manner the
consciousness that his gaze is directed on us. Through the principle of
associated habit, the same movements of the face and eyes are
practised, and can, indeed, hardly be avoided, whenever we know or
believe that, others are blaming, or too strongly praising, our moral
conduct.
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