good deal of truth, the state of chemistry at a period not far distant
from our own. These observations were made on a different subject; but
they will not, on this account, have less force, if the application of
them be thought just.
'Instead of applying observation to the things we wished to know, we
have chosen rather to imagine them. Advancing from one ill founded
supposition to another, we have at last bewildered ourselves amidst a
multitude of errors. These errors becoming prejudices, are, of course,
adopted as principles, and we thus bewilder ourselves more and more. The
method, too, by which we conduct our reasonings is as absurd; we abuse
words which we do not understand, and call this the art of reasoning.
When matters have been brought this length, when errors have been thus
accumulated, there is but one remedy by which order can be restored to
the faculty of thinking; this is, to forget all that we have learned, to
trace back our ideas to their source, to follow the train in which they
rise, and, as my Lord Bacon says, to frame the human understanding anew.
'This remedy becomes the more difficult in proportion as we think
ourselves more learned. Might it not be thought that works which
treated of the sciences with the utmost perspicuity, with great
precision and order, must be understood by every body? The fact is,
those who have never studied any thing will understand them better than
those who have studied a great deal, and especially than those who have
written a great deal.'
At the end of the fifth chapter, the Abbe de Condillac adds: 'But, after
all, the sciences have made progress, because philosophers have applied
themselves with more attention to observe, and have communicated to
their language that precision and accuracy which they have employed in
their observations: In correcting their language they reason better.'
CONTENTS.
PART FIRST.
17